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INTRODUCTION 
The law has long recognised that certain relationships give rise to a non-delegable duty of care. It has also 
been noted that the categories of non-delegable duties are not closed and that if the circumstances of the 
case satisfy the characteristics of a non-delegable duty, such a duty may be recognised.1  However, it has 
been acknowledged that the characteristics of a non-delegable duty are neither precise nor clear.2 
 In Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery [2007] HCA 6 (27 February 2007) the High Court 
held that the Council as a road authority which had engaged an independent contractor to carry out work, 
did not owe a non-delegable duty to the plaintiff pedestrian.   
THE FACTS 
On 7 April 2001 the respondent was injured when walking on a public footpath.  The Council had engaged 
Roan Constructions Pty Ltd to carry out work on the footpath.  As part of the work it was required that 
access to the shops and houses should be maintained by laying artificial grass or carpet over the top of the 
road base.  This had been done to a pit in the footpath, however it had a broken cover and as the respondent 
walked on the carpet the carpet gave way and the respondent fell into the pit, injuring his knee.  It was 
known that the pit cover was broken when the grass was laid over the top. 
 The respondent sued the Council and Roan Constructions in negligence claiming damages for personal 
injury.  The action against Roan Constructions was comprised before hearing leaving the case against the 
Council to proceed.  The trial judge found in favour of the respondent and assessed damages at 
$264,450.75, less $50,000 as paid by Roan Constructions to avoid double compensation.  The New South 
Wales Court of Appeal dismissed the Council’s appeal, agreeing with the decision of the lower court that 
the Council was liable on the basis of the negligence of the employees of Roan Constructions and that the 
respondent did not have to establish fault on the part of the Council.  The Court of Appeal followed the 
reasoning of English decisions3 which had been followed by the court in Road & Traffic Authority v Scroop 
(1998) 29 MVR 233 and Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Fletcher (2001) 33 MVR 215 and stated: 
[W]here a road authority engages a contractor to do work on a road used by the public, such as to involve 
risk to the public unless reasonable care is exercised, the road authority has a duty to ensure reasonable care 
is exercised; and the road authority will be liable if the contractor does not take reasonable care. However, 
the road authority will not be liable for casual or collateral acts of negligence by the contractor (Leichhardt 
Municipal Council v Montgomery [2005] NSWCA 432 (8 December 2005) at [23]). 
 On appeal to the High Court it was argued by the Council that the lower courts had erred in law in 
holding that it was under such a special duty.  It was claimed that the duty owed by the Council was an 
ordinary duty to take reasonable care to prevent injury to the plaintiff.  This duty included within its scope 
undertaking necessary supervision, warning pedestrians and other road users of hazards and providing 
approvals or instructions in respect of the work (at [7]). 
THE NATURE OF THE DUTY 
The issue before the High Court was whether the Council was liable for ‘the acts and omissions on the part 
of Roan [Constructions] and its employees’ on the basis that the Council owed ‘a non-delegable duty of 
care to the respondent by reason of the relationship between a public roads authority and a road user’ (at 
[49] per Kirby J). 
                                                          
1  See for example the comments of Mason J in Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672 
at 687-8. 
2  Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313 at 395 per Kirby J. 
3  See Hardaker v Idle District Council [1896] 1 QB 335; Penny v Wimbledon Urban District Council 
[1899] 2 QB 72; Holliday v National Telephone Co [1899] 2 QB 392; Salisbury v Woodland [1970] 1 
QB 324; Rowe v Herman [1997] 1 WLR 1390. 
 The scope and nature of the duty of care owed by the Council had to be determined with reference to 
the legislation enacted empowering the Council as a road authority.    As stated by Gleeson CJ at [20]: 
 At the centre of this problem there is a question of statutory construction. The common law should 
define the duty of care to which a roads authority is subject by reference to the nature of the 
statutory powers given to the authority, and the legislative intendment discernible from the terms 
in which those powers are granted, considered in the light of the purposes for which they are 
conferred. 
 His Honour briefly went through provisions of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) relevant for defining the 
Council’s duty of care in its capacity of a road authority. It was noted that the Act gave the public the right 
to pass along public roads (s 5).  The road authority had the power to carry out road work (s 71) and that 
the roads authority was the owner of public roads (s 145). His Honour stated: 
 It is consistent with that statutory scheme to conclude that there is a duty in a roads authority to take 
reasonable care to prevent physical injury to a person such as the respondent from the carrying out of road 
works. It is also consistent with the statutory scheme to conclude that, if an independent contractor is 
engaged to perform such works, the roads authority remains under a "personal" duty to take reasonable care 
to prevent such injury, and that such duty is not discharged merely by exercising care in the selection of the 
contractor. Reasonable care on the part of the roads authority may well involve a certain level of scrutiny of 
the contractor's plans and supervision of the contractor's activities. It is a different thing to say that the 
legislation imposes, or is consistent with the imposition, of a duty to ensure that no employee of the 
independent contractor act carelessly (at [22]).  
 Justice Kirby agreed, observing that the Roads Act had not conferred express immunity upon the road 
authority nor had it imposed liability upon the authority to ensure that contractors carry out road works 
without negligently inflicting harm to third parties (at [61]). 
 The court referred to the judgment of Mason J in Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 
672 at 687-8 where the characteristics of a non-delegable duty were discussed.  Justice Kirby held that 
many of the cases where a non-delegable duty had been recognised involved a ‘special vulnerability of 
persons in the particular class that includes the claimant and hence the increased enterprise risk that is 
necessary to meet an exceptional ‘risk’, ‘danger’ or ‘peril’’ (at [118]).  His Honour referred with approval 
to the comments of Gaudron J in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 at 552-3 where her 
Honour stated: 
 … another feature of the duty arising out of the particular relationships that have been identified as 
giving rise to a non-delegable duty of care which should be stressed. It is that the relevant duty can 
be expressed positively and not merely in terms of a duty to refrain from doing something that 
involves a foreseeable risk of injury ... Once the relevant duty is stated in those terms it is readily 
understandable that the duty should be described as non-delegable. 
 Analysing the relationship between a road authority and a road user, Kirby J held that there was 
significant dependence but no special vulnerability or dependence that exists in the recognised categories of 
non-delegable duties such as hospital and patient, employer and employee or school authority and student 
(at [123]).   
 What appeared to strongly influence the High Court was the impossibility of a road authority to 
discharge a non-delegable duty of care even by the adoption of ‘reasonably adapted preventive measures’ 
(at [125] per Kirby J).  Chief Justice Gleeson stated: 
 To speak of a local council having a duty to ensure that such an apparently low-level and singular 
act of carelessness does not occur is implausible. It is one thing to find fault on the part of council 
officers where there has been a failure to exercise reasonable care in supervising the work of a 
contractor, or in approving a contractor's plans and system of work. It is another thing to attribute 
to the council a legal duty of care which obliges the council to do the impossible: to ensure that no 
employee of the contractor behaves carelessly. The problem is even more acute if the source of 
this duty of care is said to be found in statute. One of the things that is special about this duty is 
that it is a duty to do the impossible. That is unlikely to have been intended by the legislature (at 
[23]). 
 Members of the court observed that due to the impossibility to discharge such a duty, to find that the 
Council owed a non-delegable duty of care would have the effect of holding it vicariously liable for the acts 
or omissions of its independent contractors.  Chief Justice Gleeson noted at [23] that often the non-
delegable duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken by a third party is one that cannot be fulfilled and 
may mean that the law is creating an exception to the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable 
for the negligence of an independent contractor.  Similarly Hayne J held: 
 … the contention that a highway authority owes a road user a non-delegable duty of care is no 
more than a different expression of the proposition that the highway authority is to be vicariously 
liable for the negligence of its independent contractors (at 142]). 
 Justice Kirby at [44] stated that if the duty of the Council owed to the respondent was recognised as 
non-delegable it would outflank the common law rule that an employer is not liable to a third party for the 
wrongs committed by its independent contractor. 
CONCLUSION  
The High Court was unanimous in finding that the Council as a road authority did owe a duty of care to the 
respondent but that the duty could not be characterised as non-delegable.   
 As noted by Hayne J, if a council has acted unreasonably and caused injury to a road user, subject to 
any statutory provision to the contrary, it will be liable.  If the council employs a competent independent 
contractor and takes reasonable care in supervising the work (such approvals and instructions for the work 
and providing warnings), the council will not be liable for any negligence on the part of the independent 
contractor.  Instead the injured road user will have action against the independent contractor (at [157]).  
This was the case in Montgomery but unfortunately the respondent settled against Roan Constructions for 
what was referred to as a modest sum (at [42]) of $50,000. 
 The case highlights the observation that there is no precise definition of a non-delegable duty.  In this 
instance the duty owed by the Council was shaped by legislation.  That legislation imposed a duty upon the 
Council as a road authority to take reasonable care but it did not impose a duty to ensure that reasonable 
care was taken by its independent contractors.  Not only will the relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant be relevant in determining whether it demonstrates the nebulous characteristics of non-delegable 
duties, the practical effect of recognising the duty as non-delegable will influence the decision. 
 The decision will be welcomed by councils and it follows the tendency of the High Court in recent 
times to go against a finding of a non-delegable duty that has the effect of imposing strict liability (see 
Callinan J at [188]). 
